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Should the OSCE finally be endowed with legal personality? I 
have a hard time positioning myself in the debate. Obviously, 
I understand the argument – brought forward at the 
conference on the legal framework of the OSCE mostly by 
practitioners working at the organization, but also by Niels 
Blokker (see the introductory post), – that legal personality 
would make work at the organization much easier. It is quite 
apparent that the OSCE would profit from being able to open 
a bank account, generally being able to enter into contracts 
of any kind, or enjoying standing before courts. And I see that 
it seems adequate for an organization exercising robust 
functions as in the ongoing OSCE Special Monitoring Mission 
to Ukraine, where it helped to facilitate and monitor a 
ceasefire, to possibly be held responsible under international 
law. It seems that the OSCE would not do much more with 
legal personality – but it would do the same things with 
greater legal certainty and relieved from the necessity to 
work around its basic defect all the time.
I also understand and sympathize with the very strong 
“Klabbersian” argument presented by Ramses Wessel that the 
parties at the table should face legal realities and end “living 
in a phantasy world”: An institution calling itself an 
organization, acting with remarkable autonomy from its 
members and claiming personality should live up to its truth 
and stop circumventing the legal order it is governed by. As 
the head of OSCE legal services, Lisa Tabassi, argued: The 
OSCE has a membership, organs, procedures, institutional 
structures, internal regulations, an internal justice system, an 
administrative head and has a will of its own. It is granted 
observer status in the UN and it is often, mission by mission, 
granted immunities. If legal personality were a matter of legal 
reality, as Rosalyn Higgins argues, there would be no doubt 
that the OSCE enjoys it.
Apparently, its participating states (not to be called 
members!) want OSCE missions to be present at most of the 
critical contact points between Russia and Europe and 
engage in various missions of boundary management, 
disarmament, election monitoring and ceasefire monitoring 
in places like Kosovo, Chechnya, Moldova, Ashgabat, Gukovo 
and Donetsk, places where often no other international 
organizations are present. In some ways, the OSCE seems to 
enjoy a status similar to the UN: No one loves it, but 
somehow everybody senses that we are better off with an 
OSCE in place than without it. It seems a rather minor and 
only logical step to end costly obstacles in the functioning of 
the organization and get away with the constant working 
around its defect.
A place for open debate
On the other hand, it seems that a strong case can be made 
against the formal legalization of the OSCE: It is widely 
agreed that the organization has had a significant impact in 
allowing smooth and informal communication between the 
Western and Soviet blocks as well as in working in important 
ways towards the democratization of the new Eastern 
European states before, during and after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. In a way, one could make the argument, that the 
Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (as it 
was initially called in explicit reference to its informal status) 
had fulfilled its function with the closure of the chapter of 
the European division and could have been dissolved at the 
time. However, it was decided in Budapest in 1994 to upgrade 
the CSCE to an “organization” – an organization by name, by 
function, but not by legal status. In hindsight it seems that 
the participants back then did not fully trust the concept of a 
unified Europe and sensed that, in the face of the reigning 
internationalist spirit at the time, it might be advisable to 
retain that proven space for discussion, liberated from high 
expectations.
One of its easily overlooked, arguably strongest points is 
being what it was designed to be: a venue for regular 
discussion, reportedly very frank, closed-doors debates 
between participant states’ diplomats and ministers. Every 
Thursday, the OSCE Permanent Council in the form of all 
ambassadors to the OSCE meets in Vienna to “consult and 
decide on all issues pertinent to the OSCE”. Therefore: Maybe 
there is an argument to be made for preserving the status quo
and not pushing overly in the direction of formal legalization 
– it may come at the cost of losing the most precious 
function of the OSCE, the one of being a place for open 
debate between Russia and “the West”, at a moment where 
more and more fora for open debate between these parties 
turn into locations of placeholder wars. As the head of the 
international law department at the Austrian foreign ministry 
Helmut Tichy said: The lack of personality was a condition for 
the success of the OSCE – maybe that still holds true to some 
extent.
Having said that, what struck me most at the conference 
were two very different and non-related observations on 
international organizations in general:
First, there is a need to discuss and find more consensual 
ways of how to evaluate the “effectiveness” of an 
organization. The opinions on the effectiveness of the OSCE 
ranged from Lisa Tabassi describing OSCE as one of the 
operationally most effective organizations she knows, as 
being small, cheap, speedy in making consensus decisions 
and being able to move quickly. Tanja Börzel, on the other 
hand, stressed the point that measuring it against its self-
proclaimed goals of securing peace and stability in Europe 
(actually the OSCE homepage lists not less than 20 different 
areas of focus of the organization!), the political science 
literature considers the OSCE as one of the least effective 
and irrelevant IOs. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes made a 
similar point with regard to the organization’s wide-ranging 
external relations to other organizations: She sketched a 
picture of manifold engagements and blurred competences, 
giving the impression that the OSCE sometimes needs to 
compensate for the lack of personality by activism. It seems 
that there is a very effective side of the OSCE, at least if the 
mandates of the OSCE missions are used as a yardstick. 
Because of the discordance regarding the basic questions, 
however, there is an ambivalence with regard to these 
successes and a hesitance to talk about them too loudly.
An illustration of a deeper lying disagreement
Finally, one got the impression that the schizophrenic state 
and mutually blocking intentions with regard to the OSCE’s 
role and future are quite telling of underlying more general 
political tensions and currents at the moment: The American 
and the Russian proposal of how to overcome the current 
stalemate are not even too far apart in content (the US 
preferring a convention on legal status and immunities 
questions, while Russia aims at a constituent treaty). It rather 
seems to be a lack of agreement on the general direction of 
international relations and law that stands in the way: 
disagreement on the question whether we still want to 
further internationalist projects or whether to give in to 
prevailing nationalist sentiments, deep-running tensions 
between Russia and the West and a general zeitgeist opposed 
to the founding of new organizations. These insecurities may 
unfortunately outweigh the functioning of an institution 
which contributes in small, uneventful, but important ways to 
the cautious stabilization of Europe’s trouble spots.
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